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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, CONTRACTS, AND REVERSE
ENGINEERING AFTER PROCD: A PROPOSED
COMPROMISE FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Anthony J. Mahajan*
Here's the formula for success in the coming era: Open, good.
Closed, bad.'
INTRODUCTION
The relation of computer software to the hardware components of a
computer is analogous to the relationship between a blade and a ra-
zor.2 Without software, a computer would not function in so many of
the ways that modem users have come to appreciate, and may not
function at all. Indeed, each and every program run on a computer
transforms that computer into a new machine, one that follows the
instructions dictated by the computer program.3 Thus, one can easily
comprehend the importance of software in the coming technological
age.
When computers were first developed in the 1950s, a communitar-
ian view of software development was the norm, and programmers
openly shared their ideas with one another.4 Program code, the in-
structions that tell a computer what to do,5 was circulated without pro-
prietary restriction.6 Developers were free to use that code,
incorporate it into their own programs, and adapt it to suit their pro-
gramming needs.7 A sense of pride and accomplishment, rather than
the desire to make money, drove the creation of new software in this
open and shared environment.8 Then things changed. Corporations
recognized the vast profitability of software, and they began to exer-
* This Note is dedicated to my family in gratitude for their faithful encourage-
ment and guidance throughout my life. I would also like to thank Lisa M. McIntyre
for her unwavering support during the writing of this Note, and my friends for always
brightening my day.
1. Peter Schwartz & Peter Leyden, The Long Boom, Wired, July 1997, at 115, 121
(noting the transition from an industrial to an information society).
2. See Harold Seneker & Jayne A. Pearl, Sofnvare to Go, Forbes, June 20, 1983,
at 93, 93.
3. See Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Pro-
tection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 Duke I". 663, 680-
81 (noting that computers are "chameleon-like" machines, and that the program de-
termines what type of machine the computer will be).
4. See Steven Levy, Code Warriors, Newsweek, Jan. 18, 1999, at 60, 60 [hereinaf-
ter Levy, Code Warriors].
5. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
6. See Steven Levy, Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution 27-28 (1984).
7. See id.
8. See id. at 30-32.
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cise tight controls over who was allowed access to their coveted code.'
This marked a shift toward a closed proprietary model of software
development.
Microsoft Corporation, one of the software development companies
that capitalized upon this metamorphosis, is now on trial.' 0 The gov-
ernment alleges that Microsoft has a monopoly in the operating sys-
tems market and uses it to control access by competitors to the
software industry." One reason for Microsoft's position of domi-
nance is that its operating system has become the consumer stan-
dard.'" Another contributing factor may be the expansion of
intellectual property protection for computer programs.' 3 Various as-
pects of computer programs may now receive copyright, patent, trade
secret, and contract protection.'4 The cumulative effect of these rights
generates concerns regarding the appropriate degree of protection for
computer programs. Proponents of a high degree of proprietary pro-
tection argue that it will lead to better software because it gives a sub-
stantial incentive to developers to create new and innovative
products.' 5 Opponents argue that high levels of protection facilitate
the seizure of material in the public domain and stifle competition. 16
Whether current proprietary protection for computer software should
be limited to promote access and competition in the software industry
is hotly debated, and is the subject of this Note.
9. See Paul Freiberger & Michael Swaine, Fire in the Valley: The Making of the
Personal Computer 153-54 (1984); Levy, Code Warriors, supra note 4, at 60. Program
code became a corporation's crown jewel, the gem to be locked away, safeguarded
from prying eyes and hands. See id.
10. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1997); United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
11. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy or Monopoly Leveraging by
Electronic Networks, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 3-5 (1998).
12. See id. at 3.
13. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java Change Everything?:
The Competitive Propriety of a Proprietary Standard, in Second Annual Internet Law
Institute 453, 456 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Hand-
book Series No. 520, 1998) [hereinafter Lemley & McGowan, Competitive Propriety].
14. See infra Part I.
15. See, e.g., Anthony L. Clapes, Confessions of an Amicus Curiae: Technophobia,
Law, and Creativity in the Digital Arts, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 903, 906 (1994) (ob-
jecting to a reduced level of intellectual property protection for computer software);
Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Com-
puter-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 977, 988
(1993) (concluding that there is no reason to believe that courts are overprotecting
software proprietors).
16. See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in tile Digi-
tal Age, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1025, 1029 n.14, 1031 (1998) (arguing that the public
domain cannot consist only of materials that information providers unilaterally
choose to provide); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Pro-
tection of Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308, 2365-71 (1994) (advocating a
market-based approach to computer software protection).
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Part I undertakes a comparative exploration of the intellectual
property laws available to protect computer software. Part II argues
that the balance between public and private rights of access to com-
puter programs has been upset by the enforcement of license agree-
ments that invariably prohibit reverse engineering, a process
traditionally viewed as an appropriate means of promoting access and
competition. Part III queries whether relying on the judiciary or the
private market to restore the balance is the most efficient and desira-
ble solution. Part IV concludes that a novel and intermediate ap-
proach is needed. This part suggests that Congress adopt a two-tiered
standard, one that is emboldened by the Constitution: permit
software producers to establish a level of true exclusive control over
their works, but require the producers to disclose their source code
after a pre-determined passage of time as a condition to maintaining
federal copyright and patent protection.
I. PROPRIETARY PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS
The precise amount of proprietary protection available to computer
programs is in flux. Courts differ regarding the extent of copyright,
patent, trade secret, and contract protection properly afforded com-
puter programs. Copyright and patent are federal statutes,17 and
trade secret and contract involve common law rights."8 The overlap of
both federal and state rights creates a comprehensive intellectual
property scheme, and makes it less likely that a work will be pirated
by second-comers. Yet, the intersection of federal and state rights is a
troubled one, and, at times, the enforcement of various state rights
may function to frustrate the objective of the federal statutes. This
part examines and compares the evolving federal and state proprie-
tary protections available to computer programs.
A. Copyright Protection for Computer Programs
The standards for obtaining copyright protection for a work are not
high. A work need only contain a modicum of originality to be enti-
17. The underpinnings of the federal copyright and patent statutes are rooted in
Article I of the United States Constitution, which provides that "Congress shall have
Power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Supreme Court has observed that
the objective of the federal intellectual property statutes is to strike a balance be-
tween private and public rights of access to information, and "to motivate the creative
activity of authors ... and to allow the public access to the products of their genius
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired." Sony Corp. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 (1984); see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (proclaiming that the limited monopoly fostered by the fed-
eral intellectual property laws "will have a positive effect on society through the intro-
duction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the
emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens").
18. See infra Part I.C-D.
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tled to copyright protection.19 Copyright in a work subsists until sev-
enty years after the death of the author.2 0 The owner of a copyright is
granted the exclusive right to reproduce the work, prepare derivative
works, distribute, display, and perform the copyrighted work.2 1 A sig-
nificant limitation of copyright, however, is that ownership of a valid
copyright in a work does not foreclose the independent creation of
that work by someone else.2 2 Further, although copyright presup-
poses that a work will be disclosed to the public,2 3 there is no explicit
requirement, as there is under patent law, 4 that this disclosure occur
as a condition to protection.25
Despite the broad protections offered by copyright law, there is a
fundamental principle, known as the idea/expression dichotomy,2 6
that can significantly limit the amount of protection afforded copy-
righted works.27 This principle dictates that protection does not ex-
tend to the ideas encapsulated in a work, but only to the original
expression of those ideas.28 The Supreme Court explained this dis-
tinction in the seminal case of Baker v. Selden.2 9 In Baker, the com-
plainant's testator held a copyright on a book that illustrated a
bookkeeping system based on forms with ruled lines and headings.3
He sued the defendant for copyright infringement after the defendant
published a book modeled on the same system that simply contained a
different arrangement of columns and headings.3' The Supreme
Court, noting that the accounting system was designed for use by the
public, 32 held that just as the author of a mathematical science text-
book cannot claim copyright in the methods of operation endorsed
therein,33 the complainant could not claim copyright in the method of
double-entry accounting expressed in the book.34 While the explana-
19. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
20. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 302(a) (West Supp. 1999).
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
22. See Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 n.2
(2d Cir. 1977).
23. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
24. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 301.
26. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556
(1985).
27. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).
28. See id.
29. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
30. See id. at 99-100.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 103.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 107.
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tion of the system was clearly copyrightable, protection for the system
itself could only be had, if at all, under "letters-patent. 35
This long-standing distinction between an idea and its expression is
codified in § 102(b) of the Copyright Act.36 Section 102(b) provides
that "[iln no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work."' 37 According to Congress, § 102(b) was not intended to enlarge
or contract the scope of copyright protection previously afforded
under the law;3" it simply makes explicit the distinction between an
idea and its expression. 9 Moreover, the legislative history makes
clear that, although the ideas embodied in a work may be hidden or
not readily perceptible by the human eye, whether exposed or not, the
ideas nevertheless are not copyrightable.40
Several additional copyright doctrines function to separate ideas,
which are not protected, from the expression of those ideas, which is
protected. The doctrine of merger dictates that if there is only one or
very few ways of expressing an idea, the expression is deemed to have
merged with the idea.4 ' If merger occurs, expression of the idea will
not be protected; otherwise, copyright would improperly be conferred
upon the idea itself.42 In the computer context, merger occurs when
specific instructions are the only and essential means of accomplishing
a given task.43 Additionally, under the judicially created doctrine of
35. See id at 105. "Letters-patent" is a reference to the patent law. See Edward C.
Walterscheid, Patents and Manufacturing in the Early Republic, 80 J. Pat. & Trade-
mark Off. Soc'y 855, 857 (1998).
36. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
37. Id.
38. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5670.
39. See id, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670.
40. Conversely, the original expression of an idea, even if not readily perceptible
by the human eye, is protected. See id at 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5665. Similarly, even though a program may be in such a form that it may only be
"perceived" by a machine, the program nonetheless may be entitled to copyright pro-
tection. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1248-51 (3d Cir. 1983) (rejecting contention that copyright is limited to works
designed to be read by a human reader); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685
F.2d 870, 876-77 (3d Cir. 1982) (determining that object code represented on a Read
Only Memory chip may be copyrighted).
41. See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991).
42. See Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, Inc., 999 F.2d
1436, 1442 (11th Cir. 1993).
43. See 5 Copyright, Congress & Technology: 'The Public Record 40 (Nicholas
Henry ed., Oryx Press 1980) [hereinafter CONTU Final Report]; see also Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37,66 (D. Mass. 1990) (noting that the
merger doctrine will deny copyright protection to certain aspects of computer pro-
grams). Regarding the application of merger to computer programs, one commenta-
tor noted that the "line [for determining when merger occurs] is a pragmatic one,
drawn not on the basis of some metaphysical property of 'ideas,' but by balancing the
1999] 3301
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scdnes d faire, certain features, symbols, or concepts that are indispen-
sable to a particular discipline are not protected.44 Courts that apply
the scdnes d faire doctrine to computer programs deny copyright pro-
tection to aspects of a program that are dictated by external factors,
such as the mechanical specifications of a computer or widely ac-
cepted programming practices within the computer industry.45 Fi-
nally, the expressive content of a work that is categorized as a "useful
article" will not be protected if the expressive aspect of the work was
dictated primarily by functional concerns.46
It is firmly established that computer programs are protected under
the Copyright Act,4 7 even though every computer program can be
conceptualized, at least to the extent the program determines the
steps to be taken in reaching a certain result, as a "procedure," "pro-
cess," or "method of operation. ' 48 After the Commission on New
Technological Uses ("CONTU") issued its findings,49 the Act was
amended in 1980 to explicitly extend copyright protection to computer
programs.5 ° Computer programs are classified under the statute as
need to protect the labors of authors with the desire to assure free access to ideas." 4
Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03[F][1], at 13-125
(1998).
44. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616
(7th Cir. 1982).
45. See Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Scientific Communications, Inc., 118 F.3d
955, 963 (2d Cir. 1997).
46. Computer programs are purely functional in that they cause a computer to
perform a particular task or set of tasks. See Dennis S. Kaijala, The Relative Roles of
Patent and Copyright in the Protection of Computer Programs, 17 J. Marshall J. Com-
puter & Info. L. 41, 42 (1998) [hereinafter Karjala, Relative Roles]. Because separat-
ing the functional aspects from the nonfunctional aspects of program code would
leave little to protect, however, the protection of computer programs under copyright
is an exception to the useful article doctrine. See Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protec-
tion of Computer Documents, Reverse Engineering, and Professor Miller, 19 U. Day-
ton L. Rev. 975, 986 (1994) [hereinafter Karjala, Copyright Protection].
47. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247-48
(3d Cir. 1983).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994); Jack E. Brown, "Analytical Dissection" of Copy-
righted Computer Software-Complicating the Simple and Confounding the Complex,
25 Ariz. St. L.J. 801, 831-32 (1993). If conceptualized in this fashion, computer pro-
grams would be denied protection under copyright law by the express terms of
§ 102(b). See Samuelson et al., supra note 16, at 2351.
49. See CONTU Final Report, supra note 43, at 21-27. CONTU was charged by
the 93rd Congress with determining the extent of copyright protection for computer
programs. See Pub. L. No. 93-573, tit. II, 88 Stat. 1873, 1873-74 (1974). CONTU,
rejecting trade secret and patent protection as viable alternatives, found that copy-
right was the intellectual property protection best suited for computer programs. See
Jack M. Haynes, Computer Software: Intellectual Property Protection in the United
States and Japan, 13 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 245, 254 (1995).
50. See Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat.
3015, 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1994)). Computer programs are defined
as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101. "Statements or instructions"
refers to program source code and object code. See infra note 53 and accompanying
text. The Act was further amended to exempt from liability owners of computer pro-
3302 [Vol. 67
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"literary works," which by definition are not limited to the expression
of words, but also include "numbers, or... numerical symbols or indi-
cia, regardless of the nature of the material objects ... in which they
are embodied."'" Moreover, courts, heeding the congressional man-
date that computer programs are copyrightable, have devised compli-
cated tests to separate the protectible aspects of computer programs
from those that are non-protectible5 2 Thus, current copyright law
protects all original expressive aspects of a computer program, includ-
ing its source code and object code.53
B. Patent Protection for Computer Programs
Patent law derives from the same constitutional clause as does
copyright law,54 and it possesses similar incentives and objectives: in-
ventors are provided with a limited monopoly on their product, in the
hope that this encouragement will stimulate and increase growth in
the useful arts.5 Patent law, however, sets higher subject matter and
grams who make or authorize the making of copies of, or adaptations to, computer
programs when necessary to operate the program. See 94 Stat. at 3028.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
52. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-12 (2d Cir.
1992). Virtually all courts addressing software copyright cases after 1992 have fol-
lowed Altai. See Mark A. Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?, 10
High Tech. L.J. 1, 14-15 (1995). But see Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d
807, 814-15 (1st Cir. 1995) (refusing to adopt the abstraction-filtration-comparison
test set forth in Altai), affd per curiam, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
53. This Note undertakes to address only a program's literal aspects, its source and
object code, even though there are additional nonliteral elements of a computer pro-
gram that may be afforded protection, such as the program's graphical display. After
a program's basic structure and design has been determined, it must be reflected in
language the computer can comprehend. See Altai, 982 F.2d at 698. First, the
programmer must write source code that reflects the program's structure in a pro-
gramming language such as COBOL or FORTRAN. See id. For the programmer, this
drafting process is comparable to a "novelist fleshing out the broad outline of his plot
by crafting from words and sentences the paragraphs that convey the ideas." Id.
(quoting Mark T. Kretschmer, Note, Copyright Protection for Software Architecture:
Just Say No!1, 1988 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 823, 826). Source code is the textual form of a
computer program and is comprised of two elements: the quasi-mathematical form of
instructions that will instruct the computer, and instructive comments inserted by the
computer programmer to help other readers understand the source code. See Andrew
Johnson-Laird, Softvare Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U. Dayton L Rev.
843, 851 n.17 (1994). Because the source code cannot be executed by a computer, the
second step is to translate or "compile" the source code into machine-readable object
code. See Altai, 982 F.2d at 698. Object code cannot be understood by humans; it is a
binary language consisting of ones and zeros which instructs the computer. See id.
Typically, only the program in object code form is distributed to the public in an effort
to preserve trade secret protection because humans cannot understand object code,
therefore, the trade secrets embodied therein cannot be discovered. See infra Part I.C.
54. See supra note 17.
55. See David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal
Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 543, 567-68 (1992).
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eligibility standards than does copyright law.56 Qualifying subject
matter is limited to "any new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter. '5 7 A patent may not be claimed on
subject matter that was known or anticipated in the prior art, or was
obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the subject area.58 These
stringent requirements ensure that patent protection is conferred only
upon those inventions that truly advance the useful arts.59
Abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena traditionally
are ineligible for patent protection; 60 while copyright protects the ex-
pression of ideas,61 a patent may only be claimed on the utilitarian
embodiment of an idea.62 In other words, copyright law generally es-
chews protection of functional works, while patent law protects only
those works that are functional.63 Further, while copyright law creates
limited monopoly rights in original expression but does not prohibit
others from using the ideas or knowledge expressed therein, the
holder of a patent is granted the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling those ideas functionally embodied by the patent.64
Finally, patent law, unlike copyright law, protects against subsequent
independent inventors.6
There also are practical considerations involved in determining
whether a particular work is best protected under a copyright or a
patent. While copyright protection is not as exclusive as patent pro-
tection, copyright subsists for the life of the author plus seventy years,
or 120 years if the author is a corporation.66 Patent protection, on the
other hand, lasts for twenty years from the date of application, after
which time the public is allowed free access to the invention. 67 More-
over, the costs associated with obtaining a patent are far higher than
those associated with a copyright. The patent process is time-consum-
ing and complicated, and a patent application may cost more than
56. See A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copyright than for Patent Protec-
tion of Computer Programs, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 351, 384 (1993).
57. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
58. See id. §§ 102, 103.
59. See Vincent Chiappetta, Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as an
"Article of Manufacture:" Software as Such as the Right Stuff, 17 J. Marshall J. Com-
puter & Info. L. 89, 100 (1998).
60. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
61. See supra Part I.A.
62. See Allen B. Wagner, Patenting Computer Science: Are Computer Instruction
Writings Patentable?, 17 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 5, 33 (1998).
63. See Karjala, Relative Roles, supra note 46, at 41-42.
64. One who, without authority, "makes, uses or sells any patented invention"
infringes a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
65. See David Bender & Anthony R. Barkume, Patents for Software-Related In-
ventions, 5 Software L.J. 279, 287 (1992).
66. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 302(a) (West Supp. 1999).
67. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
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$20,000.68 In addition, there are substantial filing fees, patent issuance
fees, and maintenance fees required to maintain the patent for its du-
ration.6 9 Copyright protection, on the other hand, may be secured for
the life of the copyright by registration and the payment of a nominal
filing fee.7'
In recent years, patent protection has become increasingly available
to computer programs.71 As computer programs begin to receive both
patent and copyright protection, the traditional distinction between
patent and copyright law-that patent law protects functional innova-
tions while copyright law eschews protection of functional works,-
has eroded with reference to computer programs because Congress
has carved out an exception for computer programs under copyright. 3
The extent of patent protection available for computer programs,
however, has yet to be clearly delineated by the courts or Congress.74
Two recent cases from the Federal Circuit both rejected the "printed
matter" doctrine.75 This judicially conceived doctrine was invoked by
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") to deny patent
protection to inventions manifested in human-readable medium in the
form of printed lines, characters, words, and digits76-as is computer
program code. The court's rejection of the printed matter doctrine is
indicative of the broadening scope of patentability for computer
programs.77
68. See John G. Mills, Possible Defenses to Complaints for Copyright Infringement
and Reverse Engineering of Computer Sofnvar: Implications for Antitrust and I.P.
Law, 80 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 101, 130 (1998).
69. See id.
70. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.3 (1998).
71. See Mark A. Lemley & David W. O'Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49
Stan. L. Rev. 255, 259 (1997).
72. See KarJala, Relative Roles, supra note 46, at 41-42.
73. See supra note 46; see also Chiappetta, supra note 59, at 156 n.285 (noting the
distinction between patent and copyright protection of computer software).
74. See Wagner, supra note 62, at 6. The Patent and Trademark Office (-PTO")
historically had viewed software components as unpatentable mathematical formula-
tions existing independently of functional structures or processes. See Lemley &
O'Brien, supra note 71, at 280-81. Thus, patent claims routinely were rejected by the
courts and the PTO unless the claim included an accompanying physical structure or
embodiment. See, eg., In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (describing the
two-part test for patentability as involving a determination first whether a mathemati-
cal algorithm is recited, and secondly, whether the algorithm is applied to physical
elements).
75. See In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that the
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks had conceded that computer software on
computer-readable media is patentable subject matter); In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579,
1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the application of the printed matter doctrine was
inappropriate where the information in question was to be processed by a machine
rather than by the human mind).
76. See Jeffrey R. Kuester et al., A New Frontier in Patents: Patent Claims to Prop-
agated Signals, 17 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 75, 77 (1998).
77. See also State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (refusing to apply the mathematical algorithm excep-
1999] 3305
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The guidelines promulgated by the PTO regarding computer-re-
lated inventions ("Examination Guidelines") signal further accept-
ance of the principle that computer programs on computer disks are
patentable.7 According to the Examination Guidelines, these pro-
grams define "structural and functional interrelationships between the
computer program and the medium which permit [their] functionality
to be realized. '79 The Examination Guidelines distinguish between
patentable and nonpatentable material by differentiating functional
from nonfunctional descriptive material.8 0 Descriptive material, such
as computer code, is patentable only if it is structurally and function-
ally interrelated to other aspects of the invention.8' Given that com-
puter programs are intrinsically different from melodies,"' while it
"would exalt form over substance" to allow music to become patenta-
ble merely because it is encoded on computer-readable medium,8 3 this
is the precise result approved by the Examination Guidelines for com-
puter programs.84 Presently, the PTO has 300 patent examiners evalu-
ating over 40,000 applications for patents on computer programs and
computer program-related inventions.8" At least 80,000 active
software patents will exist by the turn of the century. 6
tion to computer software where it produces "a useful, concrete and tangible result"),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999).
78. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg.
7478, 7482, 7487 n.1 (1996) [hereinafter Examination Guidelines]; see also Patent and
Trademark Office: Software Embodied on Diskette Is Patentable Subject Matter, PTO
Declares, 50 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 3, 3 (1995) (observing that the
PTO "declared that computer programs embodied in a tangible medium, such as a
floppy diskette, are patentable subject matter").
79. Examination Guidelines, supra note 78, at 7482.
80. See id. at 7481.
81. See id.
82. See Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism:
Intellectual Property Implication of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1091,
1112 (1995) [hereinafter Cohen, Electronic Vigilantism].
83. See Examination Guidelines, supra note 78, at 7481.
84. The Examination Guidelines state that "[w]hen functional descriptive material
[such as computer code] is recorded on some computer-readable medium it becomes
structurally and functionally interrelated to the medium and will be statutory in most
cases." Id.
85. See Mills, supra note 68, at 129. A discussion of whether the recent decisions
and PTO Guidelines impermissibly intrude into the sphere of copyright is beyond the
scope of this Note. Compare Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("Neither the
Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a thing is patentable it may not be
copyrighted."), with Wagner, supra note 62, at 36 (arguing that patent protection for
computer programs is inconsistent with copyright fundamentals).
86. See Robert C. Haldiman, Ephemeral Infringement by Customizable Software:
Liability Structures to Promote New Technology and Protect the Old, 80 J. Pat. &
Trademark Off. Soc'y 651, 674 n.13 (1998).
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C. Trade Secret Protection for Computer Programs
Common law trade secret doctrines may also protect proprietary
rights in computer programs. 87 The Uniform Trade Secrets Acts de-
fines a trade secret as follows:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertain-
able by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy.8 9
The maintenance of absolute secrecy of a trade secret is not a prereq-
uisite to the protection of a trade secret;90 only reasonable safeguards
that protect against the discovery of a trade secret are required.91 Fac-
tors considered in determining whether the secrecy of a trade secret
has been preserved may include: (1) the extent to which the informa-
87. See, e.g., Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Scientific Communications, Inc., 118
F.3d 955, 968 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that the lower court's conclusion that the individ-
ual software elements of plaintiff's computer program were not protectable did not
address plaintiff's claim that the combination of the elements was a trade secret);
Rivendell Forest Prod., Ltd. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 28 F.3d 1042, 1045 (10th Cir.
1994) (recognizing that a "trade secret can exist in a combination of characteristics
and components, each of which, by itself, is in the public domain, but the unified
process, design and operation of which, in unique combination, affords a competitive
advantage and is a protectable secret" (quoting Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Nat'l
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 342 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1965)); Harbor Software, Inc. v.
Applied Sys., Inc., 887 F. Supp. 86, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that "the overall design
of a software program may be protectable as a trade secret, even if the individual
components of that program are common knowledge in the programming industry"
(emphasis in original)). Although state trade secret law does not create true intellec-
tual property rights, as do the copyright and patent laws, it does establish standards of
conduct that protect against unethical or unfair methods of gaining access to indus-
trial technology and knowledge. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
475-76 (1974).
88. Unif. Trade Secrets Act (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). Over forty
states have adopted some version of the Act. See Arthur J. Schwab & David J. Porter,
Federal Protection of Trade Secrets: Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of
1996, J. Proprietary Rights, Apr. 1998, at 2, 2.
89. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1, 14 U.L.A. at 438. States that have not adopted
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, including New York, generally look to the first Re-
statement of Torts when defining a trade secret. See Softel, 118 F.3d at 968. The Re-
statement defines a trade secret as "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." Restatement of
Torts § 757 cmt. b. (1939)
90. See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 177 (7th
Cir. 1991); Anacomp, Inc. v. Shell Knob Servs., Inc., No. 93 Civ. 4003, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 223, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1994), affd, 29 F.3d 621 (2d Cir. 1994).




tion is known to persons both outside the business, e.g., customers,
and inside the business, e.g., employees; (2) the precautions taken to
preserve the secrecy of the trade secret; (3) the value of the informa-
tion to the holder as against competitors; (4) the amount of money
and effort expended in obtaining or developing the information; and
(5) how valuable the information would be to competitors, or the time
and expense it would take another to acquire and duplicate the infor-
mation.9 2 Thus, wide-scale distribution to the public of a certain prod-
uct will not, by itself, preclude trade secret protection.93 Accordingly,
because object code can be "read" only by a machine, the distribution
of a program in object code form preserves the distributor's right
under state trade secret laws to claim misappropriation of the pro-
gram's source code.94
Trade secret law, however, may be held preempted by § 301 of the
Copyright Act if it proscribes conduct equivalent to that prohibited by
copyright law.95 If preemption occurs, redress under state trade secret
laws will be foreclosed. 96 To escape preemption, state-created rights
must be predicated on a right extending beyond the exclusive rights
conferred by § 106 of the Copyright Act. 7 That right, known as an
"extra element," must make the nature of the state claim qualitatively
different from a federal copyright infringement claim.9" For example,
a trade secret claim based solely on the unauthorized copying of a
92. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 848 (10th Cir.
1993).
93. For example, the recipe for Coca-Cola is one of the best-kept trade secrets in
the world. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289 (D. Del.
1985).
94. See, e.g., Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 663-64 (4th Cir.
1993) (concluding that distribution of disks containing object code did not destroy the
secrecy of the source code); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 825 F.
Supp. 340, 359 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding that the contents of a computer program
distributed only in object code format were protectable trade secrets), affd, 36 F.3d
1147 (1st Cir. 1994); Barr-Mullin, Inc. v. Browning, 424 S.E.2d 226,230 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993) (finding that source code was not "readily ascertainable" from object code, and
therefore could be considered a trade secret); cf Foreign Sale of MS-DOS Is Contrib-
utory Infringement, 48 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 165, 166 (1994) (report-
ing that the court in Stac Elecs. v. Microsoft Corp., CV-93-413-ER (C.D. Cal. 5/13/94
and 6/8/94), held that trade secret protection had been lost by distribution of copies of
software to customers who could have reverse engineered it and discovered the trade
secrets).
95. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992).
Section 301 provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]othing in this title annuls or limits any
rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to...
activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclu-
sive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106." 17
U.S.C. § 301(b) (1994). The patent laws do not contain an express preemption section
and state trade secret laws may coexist with the federal patent laws. See Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1974).
96. See Altai, 982 F.2d at 716-17.
97. See Trandes, 996 F.2d at 659.
98. See Altai, 982 F.2d at 716.
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copyrighted work would be preempted by § 301 because that right
falls within the general scope of copyright law.99 On the other hand,
rights that are different in kind from the rights conferred by copyright
include breaches of confidential relationships, agreements, fiduciary
duties, and the improper appropriation of a trade secret. 1'o
Copyright preemption of trade secret claims may be avoided
through the use of contractual agreements, popularly known as
"shrinkwrap licenses." A shrinkwrap license typically offers terms
that the purchaser of the software accepts by opening the cellophane
wrapper that encases the package containing the computer
software.1 1 The license terms most often prohibit the licensee from
transferring, sublicensing, renting, leasing, conveying, copying, modi-
fying, translating, converting to another programming language, or re-
verse engineering the software.'0 2 These contracts enable computer
software manufacturers to protect material, including ideas, processes,
and systems, that might otherwise be unprotected.0 3 It is the contrac-
tual breach of promise,"° rather than obligations that arise by opera-
tion of law, that supplies the "extra element" to qualitatively
distinguish trade secret claims from copyright infringement claims
based solely on unauthorized copying. 0 5 The license prohibitions
99. See id. at 717.
100. A trade secret is appropriated improperly by "theft, bribery, misrepresenta-
tion, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage
through electronic or other means." Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 (amended 1985), 14
U.L.A. 433, 437 (1990). The Restatement's definition is virtually identical. See Re-
statement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 43 (1995) ("'Improper' means of acquiring
another's trade secret ... include theft, fraud, unauthorized interception of communi-
cations, inducement of or knowing participation in a breach of confidence, and other
means either wrongful in themselves or wrongful under the circumstances of the
case.").
101. See 5 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 43, § 27.02[B], at 27-14. "Click here"
licenses, also referred to as "clickwrap" licenses, are the electronic equivalent of
shrinkwrap licenses. See Charles R. McManis, The Privatization (or "Shrink-Wrap-
ping") of American Copyright Law, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 173, 173 (1999) [hereinafter
McManis, Privatization]. This type of license appears on a user's computer screen
when the user first loads a computer program, and requires the user to "click" his
acceptance of the terms of the license before he uses the software. See Madison, supra
note 16, at 1058. Both types of licenses will be referred to herein as shrink-wrap
licenses.
102. See Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. Cal. L
Rev. 1239, 1246 (1995) [hereinafter Lemley, Intellectual Property]. For an example of
a typical shrinkwrap license, see Vault Corp. v. Quaid Sofnvare Ltd., 847 F,2d 255,257
n.2 (5th Cir. 1988).
103. See Madison, supra note 16, at 1029 n.11. Both patent and copyright laws pro-
tect only those ideas that are either functionally or expressively embodied in a work.
See supra Part L.A-B.
104. The contractual breach of promise may also be referred to as a breach of trust
or confidential relationship. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Be-
tween Copyright and Contrac" Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45
Duke LI. 479, 523 (1995) [hereinafter O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary].
105. See Frontline Test Equip., Inc. v. Greenleaf Software, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 583,
592 (W.D. Va. 1998).
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against reverse engineering or otherwise modifying a program also
help to preserve the secrecy of computer software, which is necessary
for trade secret protection. 10 6 Thus, state trade secret claims may pro-
ceed alongside federal copyright claims."0 7
D. Contract Protection for Computer Programs
Early in the history of computer software development, a question
existed regarding whether software was protectable under copyright,
patent, or trade secret law.10 8 Congress did not amend the Copyright
Act to explicitly include computer programs until 1980,109 and patent
protection for certain types of software was not accepted by the courts
until 1994.110 To combat this uncertainty, computer software manu-
facturers, perceiving that intellectual property protection was lacking,
devised shrinkwrap licenses to obtain the necessary proprietary pro-
tection for their products."' Shrinkwrap licenses were routinely held
unenforceable, 1 2 however, until the Seventh Circuit's recent holding
in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.113
In ProCD, the defendant, Matthew Zeidenberg, had purchased a
copy of ProCD's Select Phone computer program and database con-
taining over 95,000,000 phone listings compiled from approximately
3000 public telephone books." 4 The Select Phone program was sold
subject to a shrinkwrap license that prohibited the purchaser from
making "the Software or the Listings in whole or in part available to
any other user in any networked or time-shared environment, or
transfer[ing] the Listings in whole or in part to any computer other
than the computer used to access the Listings."' 15 In violation of this
provision, Zeidenberg extracted the phone listings from the Select
106. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
107. See 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 43, § 1.01[B][1], at 1-10 to -17.
108. See Stephen Fraser, Canada-United States Trade Issues: Back from Purgatory?
Why Computer Software "Shrink-Wrap" Licenses Should Be Laid to Rest, 6 TuI. J.
Int'l & Comp. L. 183, 189 (1998).
109. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
110. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542-45 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that patenta-
bility is not precluded even though computer program contains mathematical subject
matter).
111. See Thomas M.S. Hemnes, Restraints on Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and
the Feudal Nature of Computer Software Licensing, 71 Denv. U. L. Rev. 577, 578-80
(1994).
112. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105-06 (3d Cir.
1991) (rejecting the defendant's argument that, under the U.C.C., shrinkwrap licenses
were binding modifications); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269-70
(5th Cir. 1988) (affirming lower court's holding that shrinkwrap license at issue was an
unenforceable contract of adhesion); Lemley, Intellectual Property, supra note 102, at
1248-53 (observing that before ProCD, shrinkwrap licenses were not enforced).
113. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
114. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644-45 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 86
F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
115. Id. at 645.
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Phone program, included them in his own database program, and
made the package available on his company's website on the In-
ternet.1 1 6 ProCD then sued Zeidenberg and his company, Silken
Mountain Web Services, for copyright infringement, breach of the li-
cense agreement, and unfair competition.' 1 7
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, holding that Zeidenberg's use of ProCD's computer pro-
gram fell within § 117 of the Copyright Act because Zeidenberg used
ProCD's program only to access the data supplied by ProCD."8
Although the Select Phone program was within the scope of the Copy-
right Act as a compilation of facts, according to the court, the tele-
phone and address data contained therein were not copyrightable
because they were not sufficiently original." 9 The court also held that
the shrinkwrap license was not breached because the defendants had
not assented to its terms,"2 and that even if the license were enforcea-
ble, the agreement was "preempted by federal copyright law to the
extent plaintiff intended it to apply to uncopyrightable data."' 2'
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Easterbrook, reversed
the district court."22 After finding shrinkwrap licenses generally en-
forceable," the court held that § 301 of the Copyright Act did not
preempt their enforcement.'24 In so holding, the court drew a distinc-
tion between the rights conferred by copyright, which are enforceable
rights against the entire world regardless of the existence of an agree-
ment, and rights created by contract, the enforceability of which de-
pend on proof of a contractual agreement.' 25 According to the
Seventh Circuit, § 301 does not interfere with private transactions in
116. See id.
117. See id. at 644.
118. See id. at 649-50. Section 117 provides, in pertinent part:
[I]t is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to
make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that com-
puter program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in
the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and
that it is used in no other manner ....
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994).
119. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 656-57. The Supreme Court, in Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), reiterated that copyright will
only be afforded those works that satisfy the constitutionally mandated standard of
originality. See id. at 347-48. The Court further stated that it is a well-established
proposition that facts, such as the phone and address listings in ProCD, and ideas are
not copyrightable. See id at 344.
120. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 644.
121. Id.
122. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
123. See id. at 1452-53.




intellectual property;126 thus, private parties are free to set up between
themselves controlling rights and restrictions that are not equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the scope of copyright.' 27
Courts and commentators have generally accepted ProCD as con-
firmation that shrinkwrap licenses are now enforceable. 28 Moreover,
the drafters of the proposed Uniform Computer Information Transac-
tions Act also have adopted the position that shrinkwrap licenses are
valid. 129 Under the proposed draft, the licenses are enforceable as
long as purchasers have the opportunity to review and manifest assent
to the terms of the license, along with the ability to reject the terms
and return the software for a refund. 3 °
The enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses has far-reaching implica-
tions for the intellectual property regime generally, and the use and
development of computer programs in particular, because the licenses
supplement the federal intellectual property regime with the added
protection of trade secret and contract. Indeed, commentators have
argued that shrinkwrap licenses threaten to engulf pre-existing intel-
lectual property schemes, bringing about the privatization of intellec-
tual property protection for digital works.13 ' Whether this is a good
idea is debatable; 32 if left unchecked, however, the private sphere will
126. The Seventh Circuit stated that a "copyright is a right against the world. Con-
tracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties; strangers may do as they please,
so contracts do not create 'exclusive rights."' See id. at 1454.
127. See id. at 1455.
128. See, e.g., Expediters Int'l of Wash., Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo Management
Servs., Inc., 995 F. Supp. 468, 483 (D.N.J. 1998) (noting that a contract claim is not
equivalent to rights under copyright law because a promise is required); Lattie v.
Murdach, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1240, 1244 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (concluding that a con-
tract claim is not equivalent to exclusive copyright rights); Architectronics, Inc. v.
Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425, 438-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (recognizing that the con-
sensus among courts and commentators is that breach of contract claims are not pre-
empted by the Copyright Act); Madison, supra note 16, at 1053 & n.104 (citing
commentators).
129. See National Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Commer-
cial Code Article 2B: Software Contracts and Licenses of Information § 2B-208
("Mass-Market Licenses") (visited Apr. 11, 1999) <http://www.law.uh.edu/ucc2b/
080198/080198.html> (Aug. 1, 1998 draft) [hereinafter Uniform Computer Act]. The
former Article 2B for Licenses, when finalized, will no longer supplement the UCC
with provision for electronic contracts and software licensing agreements, but instead
will be promulgated as the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act. See Na-
tional Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws & Am. Law Inst., NCCUSL to
Promulgate Freestanding Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act: ALl and
NCCUSL Announce That Legal Rules for Computer Information Will Not Be Part of
UCC (visited Apr. 16, 1999) <http://www.ali.org/ali/pr040799.htm>.
130. See Uniform Computer Act, supra note 129, § 2B-208.
131. See Madison, supra note 16, at 1029-31; McManis, Privatization, supra note
101, at 173.
132. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights
Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 557, 616-17 (1998)




likely dictate the future constitution of computer software in the pub-
lic sphere entirely.' 33
With the additional protection of contract, exclusive proprietary
rights that extend beyond those conferred by the federal statutes may
now be established between individuals. 3 Additionally, contractual
provisions help to preserve trade secret claims that might otherwise be
preempted by the Copyright Act.'35 After ProCD, proprietary pro-
tection for computer programs may now be expressed in terms of the
line between federal copyright and patent rights, which are good
against the world and favor disclosure, 36 and state trade secret and
contract rights enforceable against particular individuals that inhibit
access.
Determining the extent to which proprietary rights to computer
software should extend beyond that which federal intellectual prop-
erty laws bestow can best be accomplished by examining the debate
surrounding the use of reverse engineering. Computer programs are
distributed in object code format in an effort to preserve trade secret
protection. The ideas embedded in the object code cannot be per-
ceived by humans unless the object code is converted back to human-
readable source code. This may be accomplished through the process
of reverse engineering, which is generally permitted under the federal
statutes. Thus, as discussed below in part II, an apparent conflict
arises when contractual provisions prohibiting reverse engineering are
enforced.
H. FRAMING THE DEBATE AGAINST A REVERSE
ENGINEERING BACKDROP
This part defines the process of reverse engineering and examines
different purposes for which reverse engineering is undertaken. Addi-
tionally, this part explores the status of reverse engineering under fed-
eral and state laws.
A. Reverse Engineering Generally
Intellectual property law attempts to strike an appropriate balance
between the individual's private property interest and the general
public's interest in having access to knowledge and innovation.' 3 The
tension between the competing objectives is clear, and the imperfect
balance is in constant need of re-calibration. With regard to computer
133. See Madison, supra note 16, at 1031-32.
134. See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual
Property Licensing, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 111, 148 (1999) [hereinafter Lemley, Beyond
Preemption].
135. See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
136. See Lemley & O'Brien, supra note 71, at 276.
137. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Benveen the Patent and Copyright Para-
digms, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2432, 2436-42 (1994).
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programs, perhaps the most rapidly developing and evolving intellec-
tual property today, the raging debate among commentators asks how
this balance is best achieved: to what extent should computer pro-
grams be in the public domain?
The debate is best illustrated in the context of determining the le-
gality of reverse engineering computer programs. Reverse engineer-
ing has been described simply as a "fair and honest means ... [of]
starting with the known product and working backward to divine the
process which aided in its development or manufacture.' 1 38 In the
mechanical world, reverse engineering is simply the process of taking
something apart to determine what makes it tick. 139 When applied to
computer programs, however, reverse engineering becomes more
complicated.140 Generally, reverse engineering is the process of deriv-
ing a program's human-readable source code from its object code.14 1
Whether to permit reverse engineering is a question that entails the
balancing of competing public and private objectives. First, one might
reverse engineer a program solely to study and learn from the pro-
gram, or to use the source code to teach computer programming. 142
Second, reverse engineering makes programs more effective and relia-
ble by allowing the debugging, customization, and modification of a
program's source code.1 43 Third, one may desire to reverse engineer a
program to develop a compatible or interoperable product. 144 Finally,
reverse engineering may be undertaken in an effort to produce a func-
tionally equivalent market substitute for the original program.145 The
first three purposes arguably are desirable and in the public interest,
while the fourth poses the greatest danger to the interests of software
producers due to the relative ease with which a computer program
138. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
139. See Johnson-Laird, supra note 53, at 843.
140. For a detailed technical discussion regarding the complexities of reverse engi-
neering, see id.
141. Reverse engineering is necessary for users and developers who desire to ex-
amine the structure and technical parameters of a computer program because object
code is not intelligible to humans. See Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property Pro-
tection and Reverse Engineering of Computer Programs in the United States and the
European Community, 8 High Tech. L.J. 25, 29 (1993) [hereinafter McManis, Intellec-
tual Property].
142. See G. Gervaise Davis III, Scope of Protection of Computer-Based Works: Re-
verse Engineering, Clean Rooms and Decompilation, in 15th Annual Computer Law
Institute 115, 142-45 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course
Handbook Series No. 370, 1993). Reverse engineering for educational purposes likely
is a "fair use" under 17 U.S.C. § 107. See id. at 142-43. Indeed, program source code
is a valuable tool used to teach computer programming. See Clayton Walnum, Win-
dows 98 Programming Secrets (1998) (enclosing on compact disk the source code for
all programs in tutorial book).
143. See McManis, Intellectual Property, supra note 141, at 29-30.
144. See id. at 30-31.
145. See id. at 31.
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may be appropriated by second-comers.146 Framed more narrowly,
the question is whether the goals in the public interest may be
achieved in a manner that retains sufficient access restrictions to pre-
vent the outright piracy of computer programs. 47
Whether the interests of the public sphere are more appropriately
delineated by statute or left to a private ordering is the underlying
dilemma. Although reverse engineering is not explicitly permitted
under the federal copyright and patent statutes, the act of reverse en-
gineering alone is not likely to constitute infringement. 48 Moreover,
reverse engineering has long been considered a legal means of discov-
ering a trade secret.149 Thus, the process of reverse engineering can
be viewed as a tool employed by the public to permissibly calibrate
the balance between public and private rights. After ProCD, how-
ever, right holders are able to prohibit the public from engaging in
reverse engineering by private contract.' 50 Where this occurs, the pri-
vate sphere arguably has tipped the scales too heavily in its favor.151
B. The Extent to Which Reverse Engineering Is Permitted Under
Federal and State Laws
1. Reverse Engineering and Copyright Law
Courts have carved out a limited "fair use"'152 exception to an action
for copyright infringement based on copying necessarily involved in
146. Computer program code is especially vulnerable to fast, precise, and inexpen-
sive copying. See Dennis S. KarJala, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Stiruc-
ture, 64 Brook. L. Rev. 519, 532-33 (1998) [hereinafter KarJala, Program Structure].
Therefore, allowing unauthorized users to appropriate the benefits of a producer's
investment implicates the classic "public goods" problem. See Robert Cooter &
Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 108-12 (1988). This occurs when producers, wor-
ried that they will not be able to recoup their investment in a good before its value is
appropriated by free riders, undersupply the market for the good. See id.; see also
Samuelson et al., supra note 16, at 2337-41 (discussing the public goods problem and
market failure associated with computer software).
147. See Madison, supra note 16, at 1097 (questioning how to conceive of the public
domain in a fashion that allows private restrictions on access to a socially acceptable
degree).
148. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
149. See infra Part II.B.3.
150. See infra Part II.B.4.
151. See David A. Rice, Digital Information as Property & Product: U.C.C. Article
2B, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 621, 636-38 (1997) (arguing that object code must be reverse
engineered in order to free up the unprotected ideas embedded therein).
152. For the statutory foundation of the fair use doctrine, see 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1994). The statute requires a consideration of four factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
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the process of reverse engineering because the ideas embedded in
computer programs may not otherwise be ascertainable. 1-3 While
older decisions refused to recognize a right to reverse engineer,15 4
modern case law clearly authorizes it under certain circumstances.1I5
For example, in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,'56 Accolade
desired to make game programs for Sega's Genesis home entertain-
ment system, but the Genesis system was equipped with a "lock-out"
program that did not allow games to be played that did not contain
Sega's initialization code. 157 Rather than obtain a license from Sega
for the code, Accolade reverse engineered Sega's program, figured
out the intitialization code, and copied it into Accolade's own game
programs, thereby making them compatible with the Genesis sys-
tem.158 Sega sued, alleging, among other things, copyright infringe-
ment.1 59 The trial court held that the copies of Sega's initialization
code necessarily made by Accolade during the process of reverse engi-
neering likely constituted copyright infringement, and that Accolade's
copying presumptively was not a fair use because it was primarily for
commercial purposes.' 6° The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that re-
verse engineering will be considered a fair use if there is a legitimate
reason for reverse engineering, and it is the sole method of gaining
access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in a computer
program.1 6 ' This reasoning applies even if the transaction was, in fact,
commercial in nature. 62
Courts that have considered the same issue have reached similar
holdings. 163 Reverse engineering a product to develop a competing
product and to create an interoperable product are therefore reasons
regarded by the courts as legitimate under certain circumstances. No
case, however, holds that there is a universal right to reverse engineer
Id.
153. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Eco-
nomic Effects, 86 Calif. L. Rev. 479, 524-25 (1998) [hereinafter Lemley & McGowan,
Legal Implications].
154. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253
(3d Cir. 1983); Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659
F. Supp. 449, 460 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
155. See Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1539 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996)
(holding that reverse engineering a computer program to reveal the unprotectable
ideas embedded in the object code is a fair use); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of
Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (same); DSC Communications Corp. v.
Pulse Communications Inc., 976 F. Supp. 359, 364 (E.D. Va. 1997) (same).
156. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
157. See id. at 1514-15.
158. See id. at 1514-16.
159. See id. at 1516.
160. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1396-99 (N.D. Cal.),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
161. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527.
162. See id. at 1522-23.
163. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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for any purpose or in all circumstances. 164 Therefore, while the public
generally may reverse engineer materials in the private domain,
courts, relying on the doctrine of fair use, are able to preserve the
balance between public and private rights to copyrighted works.
2. Reverse Engineering and Patent Law
With regard to patented computer programs, if one makes, uses, or
sells products that infringe the patent, reverse engineering will not be
a defense to an action for patent infringement, even if done for com-
mercial research purposes. 165 Patent protection, however, is premised
not upon the secrecy of an invention, but rather upon the ability to
preclude others from making, using, or selling any physical embodi-
ment of the ideas functionally embodied in the invention. 166 There-
fore, the unavailability of reverse engineering is theoretically
mitigated because patent law explicitly mandates that protection be
granted only upon disclosure of the invention to the public. 67 The
invention must be disclosed in sufficient detail to enable one skilled in
the art to make and use the invention."6 Thus, even after patent pro-
tection is awarded for a new, useful, and nonobvious invention, the
disclosure requirements allow others to examine and study the under-
lying ideas, theories, and principles with an eye toward "designing
around" the patented program and building upon the ideas embodied
therein. 169
The reverse engineering of a patented program, however, may be
necessary for a number of reasons. Although those who do not dis-
close a program's code risk losing patent protection for that aspect of
their program, 70 patent disclosure requirements do not mandate that
the source code of the patented program be disclosed. 7' Addition-
ally, reverse engineering may be needed to gain access to unpatented
components of the program or to discover information not disclosed
in sufficient detail."7 Therefore, if undertaken for the purposes of
compatibility, competition, or study, as long as the reverse engineer
does not use the discovered knowledge to make, use, or sell the pat-
ented product, it is likely that the mere act of reverse engineering does
164. See Lemley & McGowan, Legal Implications, supra note 153, at 525.
165. See id. at 524.
166. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
167. See id. § 112.
168. See id
169. See Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
170. See Lemley & O'Brien, supra note 71, at 295 n.259.
171. See Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng'g, Inc., 112 F.3d 1163,1166 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Lawrence D. Graham & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., Economically Efficient Treat-
ment of Computer Software: Reverse Engineering, Protection, and Disclosure, 22
Rutgers Computer & Tech. LJ. 61, 96-97 (1996).
172. See Lemley & McGowan, Legal Implications, supra note 153, at 524 n.195.
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not constitute patent infringement. 173 Thus, the balance between pub-
lic and private rights is also preserved under the patent laws. While
the public may reverse engineer a patented program to learn about it
and build upon the ideas embedded therein, if the reverse engineer
uses the knowledge acquired to make, use, or sell a replica of the pat-
ented program, the statutory rights of the private owner will be
infringed. 174
3. Reverse Engineering and Trade Secret Law
Trade secret protection, standing alone, cannot protect against the
reverse engineering of a product by competitors.17 5 Thus, to preserve
trade secret protection for computer source code, it was necessary for
manufacturers to take security measures beyond simply distributing
the program in object code form, such as password access and encryp-
tion.176 Although these measures made comprehension of the ideas
underlying the program difficult, the general public's right to attempt
to understand the program was preserved by the absence of any prohi-
bition against reverse engineering. Accordingly, the unrestricted pub-
lic right to reverse engineer served as a check on the undue
constriction of the public sphere by private owners, and helped to
maintain the balance between the public and private spheres. Now,
however, because an indispensable provision in any shrinkwrap li-
cense is a prohibition on reverse engineering, if shrinkwrap licenses
are enforceable, the delicate balance has been shattered. This is due
to the fact that the public's right to access the ideas embedded in com-
puter programs is wholly circumscribed by private legislation.17 7
4. Reverse Engineering and Private Contract
Shrinkwrap licenses, as the means by which private prohibitions
against reverse engineering are enforced, allow private owners to
overrule case law providing that reverse engineering is a permissible
means of promoting competition and compatibility.17  Under federal
173. See Graham & Zerbe, supra note 171, at 99.
174. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
175. See, e.g., Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290, 1293 (5th Cir. 1970)
(holding that it is not a misappropriation to discover a trade secret by reverse engi-
neering); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 43 (1995) ("Independent dis-
covery and analysis of publicly available products or information are not improper
means of acquisition.").
176. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual
World, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 609, 612-13 (1998) [hereinafter O'Rourke, Fencing
Cyberspace].
177. See Madison, supra note 16, at 1130. If reverse engineering is forbidden by
contract, software developers may be granted de facto monopolies over ideas,
processes, and systems that have not met the standards for copyright or patent protec-
tion. See DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications Inc., 976 F. Supp.
359, 364 (E.D. Va. 1997); Samuelson et al., supra note 16, at 2390 n.329.
178. See supra Part II.B.1.
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statutes, reverse engineering alone will not constitute infringement in
most cases, and, under state trade secret law, if a trade secret is appro-
priated by reverse engineering, an action for misappropriation will not
lie.1 7 9 Where reverse engineering is prohibited by contract, however,
there is no similar exception to an action for breach of contract
brought against one who reverse engineers while contractually bound.
Accordingly, private contract is the overriding force that allows pri-
vate right owners to maintain control over the balance between public
and private rights.180 Private owners may employ contracts as a
means of enforcing their own view as to what should be the appropri-
ate balance between public and private rights. Without a means, such
as the right to reverse engineer, to influence this private determina-
tion, the public sphere inevitably shrinks.
The best method of restoring the balance between public and pri-
vate rights to computer softwvare-that is, if one first accepts the
premise that the balance is askew-is open to question. The judiciary
may be the entity to restore this balance most effectively, as incremen-
tal decisions may, over time, produce a stable set of rules that reflect a
desirable construction of the public sphere. 81 Another approach
would be to leave it to the private market to correct the balance. Fi-
nally, congressional action may be necessary to implement broad pol-
icy determinations regarding the appropriate constitution of the public
sphere. Relying solely on the judiciary or the private market to re-
store the balance, however, may not protect the public sphere from
undue constriction at the hands of private owners. The next part ad-
dresses this concern.
-HI. RESTORING THE BALANCE
This part considers the various approaches that have been adopted
by courts addressing private constraints that unduly hinder the objec-
tives of the federal intellectual property laws. This part also evaluates
the argument that, if left unchecked, private market forces will ulti-
mately determine the appropriate balance between public and private
rights.
A. Judicial Intervention
The judiciary possesses the ability to enforce federal intellectual
property rights over state-created rights in at least three ways: pre-
emption, "first sale," and misuse. This section explores each of these
approaches.
179. See supra Part II.B.1-3.
180. See McManis, Privatization, supra note 101, at 176.
181. See Madison, supra note 16, at 1137-38.
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1. The Three Approaches
a. Preemption
The first approach to addressing private prohibitions against reverse
engineering is preemption theory. This argument posits that state law
rights comparable to or extending beyond those conferred by federal
laws should be preempted if those rights confer proprietary rights in
unprotectable aspects or components of works otherwise entitled to
protection. 18 2 In other words, Congress, through the federal patent
and copyright statutes, has made a judgment as to the appropriate
level of protection to be granted those works eligible for federal pro-
tection, and the states have no authority to interpose their own
schemes or alter Congress's judgment. 183 This approach would sanc-
tion reverse engineering as a permissible tool, one used to free up
unprotected ideas concealed in a program's object code, allow others
to build upon them, promote study and compatibility, and encourage
competition. Moreover, preemption would prevent states from grant-
ing to their citizens enforceable rights, which would vary from state to
state, extending beyond those conferred by federal statutes.
The preemption of private prohibitions against reverse engineering
presumably would be achieved either vis-A-vis § 301 of the Copyright
Act or, more likely, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
As previously noted, the general consensus is that private contractual
rights are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the prov-
ince of copyright due to the existence of a contractual obligation.'84 A
recent exception is Symantec Corp. v. McAfee Associates, Inc.'85 In
that case, the court held that a software license prohibition against
reverse engineering was preempted by § 301.186 The Symantec court
provided no legal reasoning or justification for its holding; whether
subsequent courts will adopt its holding remains to be seen.
The Supremacy Clause, 87 the constitutional foundation of § 301,188
may provide a more viable alternative to federal preemption of state-
created rights. 89 The Supremacy Clause preempts state law in areas
182. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 1089, 1130-31 (1998) [hereinafter Cohen, Self-Help].
183. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A
Market-Based Approach, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 53, 80 (1997) [hereinafter O'Rourke,
Copyright Preemption].
184. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
185. No. C-97-20367-JF, 1998 WL 740798 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 1998).
186. See id. at *4-*5.
187. The Supremacy Clause provides, in pertinent part, that the "Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be
the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
188. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 131 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5747.
189. Indeed, Congress, when enacting § 301, did not consider the possibility of in-
tervening state contractual rights that would permit the displacement of copyright.
See Cohen, Self-Help, supra note 182, at 1130. Additionally, the ProCD court may
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where Congress has mandated by express decree,' 90 where congres-
sional regulation in a certain area gives rise to the inference that Con-
gress left no room for supplementary state regulation,19' and where a
state law conflicts with federal law to such a degree that the state law
hinders the purposes and objectives of Congress.' 92 Congress has not
spoken directly on the issue of federal preemption of state rights in
the computer program context, and generally has permitted states to
supplement federal intellectual property protection with their own
schemes to some degree.' 93 The third method of Supremacy Clause
preemption, however, may provide courts with the ability to deal flex-
ibly with preemption issues. Courts faced with determining whether a
state right hinders the purpose and objectives of Congress in passing
the patent and copyright statutes are provided with two differing view-
points regarding congressional purpose. One viewpoint is that Con-
gress wanted to further the public good by allowing the public access
to innovative works and inventions. 94 A second, equally valid, view-
point is that Congress intended to reward authors and inventors by
providing them with a limited monopoly over their works and inhib-
iting third-party appropriation. 195
Preemption theory, however, may not be adequate to establish an
appropriate balance between public and private rights. The ProCD
court implied that prohibitions against reverse engineering would not
be preempted because they "serve the same procompetitive functions
as does the law of trade secrets."' 96 Moreover, preemption theory
alone may not be sufficient to preserve the objective of the intellectual
property laws. 97 It is undesirable to preempt the entire field of li-
censing contracts, and § 301 preemption may not provide courts with
the ability to preempt individual contractual terms while leaving the
remainder of the contract intact.' 98 Therefore, as one commentator
has suggested, the application of field preemption to contracts is akin
have failed to consider preemption under the Supremacy Clause. See D.C. Toedt III,
COUNTERPOINT: Shrinkwrap License Enforceability Issues, Computer Law., Sept.
1996, at 7, 8-9.
190. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,280-81 (1987).
191. See i.
192. See id. at 281.
193. See Cohen, Self-Help, supra note 182, at 1130-31.
194. See supra note 17.
195. See supra note 17.
196. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omit-
ted). But see McManis, Privatization, supra note 101, at 182-84 (contending that such
provisions should be preempted). The court presumably would analogize prohibitions
against reverse engineering to encryption devices, which similarly hinder comprehen-
sion of a program's source code.
197. See Lemley, Beyond Preemption, supra note 134, at 144-51.
198. See hi. at 145.
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to "swinging a sledgehammer at a gnat." '199 Moreover, Supremacy
Clause preemption poses difficulties for courts because it is often un-
clear whether a contract term directly conflicts with a federal stat-
ute.2 00 This uncertainty may reduce the effectiveness and reliability of
preemption theory. 1
b. "First Sale" Doctrine
A second approach to addressing state-created rights, which was re-
cently adopted by one post-ProCD court, involves a broader judicial
policy determination than does preemption. In Novell, Inc. v. Net-
work Trade Center, Inc.,202 the defendant, a computer program dis-
tributor, was in the practice of purchasing computer programs from
the plaintiff, applying for the plaintiffs "upgrade" for those programs,
and then selling the upgrade for a profit to the end-users of the pro-
gram.20 3 The plaintiff subsequently announced that distributors would
no longer be permitted to sell its upgrades, and that end-users who
wanted the upgrades would have to purchase them directly from the
plaintiff.20 4 The defendant persisted in selling the plaintiff's upgrades
to end-users, and the plaintiff sued. 0 5 One of the plaintiff's claims
was that the defendant, by selling unauthorized upgrades to end-users,
caused end-users to infringe the plaintiffs copyright when they loaded
the upgrades onto their computers without valid licenses from the
plaintiff.20 6 The defendants contended that the end-users were owners
of the computer programs, not licensees, who were entitled under the
"first sale" doctrine to use the program without regard to the rights of
the plaintiff as copyright holder.2 7 The court agreed with the defend-
ants, holding that sales of computer software are governed by the
UCC, the purchaser is an "owner" by way of the sale, and that the
"first sale" doctrine was applicable. 0 8 Therefore, the shrinkwrap
licenses included with plaintiffs software were invalid insofar as they
purported to maintain title in the software in the plaintiff.2 0 9 Thus,
according to the court, because computer programs are goods, shrink-
199. Id.; see also Apik Minassian, Comment, The Death of Copyright: Enforceabil-
ity of Shrinkwrap Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 569, 601-07 (1997) (urging
a more nuanced approach to preemption under § 301).
200. See Lemley, Beyond Preemption, supra note 134, at 146.
201. See id.
202. 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Utah 1997).
203. See id. at 1222.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 1229.
207. See id. The "first sale" doctrine provides that "the owner of a particular copy
... lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled,
without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the pos-
session of that copy ...." 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994).




wrap licenses are, on the whole, unenforceable because title is not re-
tained by the program manufacturer after sale.
The position adopted by the Novell court, however, is inconsistent
with the weight of authority. 10 Moreover, the Novell court effectively
foreclosed redress to state contractual licensing rights by holding that
computer programs are sold as goods. Although retailers and distrib-
utors of computer programs would be able to rely on shrinkwrap
licenses, a producer's right of control would be terminated after the
first sale.2 11 Therefore, unbridled application of the first sale doctrine,
as in Novell, may pose a significant disincentive to producers that con-
template investing in the development of new products. 2 12 The court's
holding represented a broad policy determination of the nature better
left to Congress.
c. Copyright/Patent "Misuse" Doctrines
A third approach that gives implicit power to the courts to mediate
between public and private rights to proprietary information relies on
an expanded role of the patent and copyright "misuse" doctrines. 13
Copyright misuse occurs when a copyright is used to secure an exclu-
sive right or limited monopoly beyond that granted by copyright law
and which is contrary to public policy.2 14 The patent misuse doctrine
forbids the use of a patent in a similar manner or to accomplish similar
ends.21 5 The preeminent case on misuse in the computer software
context is Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds.1 6 In Lasercomb, the
plaintiff had developed computer software that assisted in the design-
ing of steel rule dies used to cut and score paper and cardboard." 7
The corporate defendant, Holiday Steel Rule Die Corporation, li-
censed several copies of the software from the plaintiff and created its
own, virtually identical, program that it sold under its own label?.1
The plaintiff sued for copyright infringement, and the defendants as-
serted a defense of copyright misuse.219 On the plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, the trial court found that the defendants' misuse
210. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
211. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Betveen Contract
and Intellectual Property Law, 13 Berkeley Tech. LJ. 827, 883 (1998) [hereinafter
Nimmer, Breaking Barriers].
212. See id. at 831 ("The claim that first sale rights control is... a matter of turning
the relationship between contract and copyright on its head.").
213. The misuse doctrine gives courts a means by which to prevent over-reaching to
achieve anti-competitive ends. See id. at 870-71.
214. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990).
215. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491-92 (1942).
216. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
217. See id at 971.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 972.
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defense failed to create a genuine issue of fact.22 ° The Fourth Circuit
reversed, finding evidence of misuse in the fact that Lasercomb's stan-
dard license agreement prohibited licensees from creating competing
software programs during the ninety-nine year term of the license.22'
According to the court, "this anticompetitive restraint" could exist
"longer than the life of the copyright itself. ' 2 The court, after imply-
ing that patent misuse is analogous to copyright misuse,2z further
stated that the determinative question was whether the copyright was
used in a manner that violated the public policy underlying a grant of
copyright.22 4 Thus, under Lasercomb, depriving licensees of the abil-
ity to create competing products is violative of the public policy of
copyright if the prohibition extends for a longer term than does the
copyright itself. Under this reasoning, given that contracts may be
binding indefinitely,225 contractual prohibitions against reverse engi-
neering are likely unenforceable.2 2 6
The boundaries of the misuse doctrine have yet to be fleshed out
completely by the courts.227 It remains unclear which licensing provi-
sions would be held violative of public policy, and what precisely
would be considered an effort to secure an exclusive right or limited
monopoly in excess of that granted by the federal copyright and pat-
ent laws. 2 8 Whether misuse is applicable to state trade secret claims
is also unclear.22 9 Finally, misuse has been recognized only as a de-
fense to an action, and has yet to be permitted as an affirmative in-
dependent cause of action. 30
2. Criticisms of Judicial Intervention
It is questionable whether the judicial forum is the most efficient
means of determining when, and to what extent, public access to the
ideas embedded in computer programs should be permitted.2 3' The
220. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Holiday Steel Rule Die Corp., 656 F. Supp. 612,
616 (M.D.N.C. 1987) rev'd, 911 F.2d 970 (1990).
221. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.
222. Id. (footnote omitted).
223. See id. at 977.
224. See id. at 978.
225. See P.C. Films Corp. v. MGM/UA Home Video, Inc., 138 F.3d 453, 457-58 (2d
Cir.) (holding that a "perpetual" license is enforceable, at least for the term of the
copyright), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 542 (1998). Moreover, section 2B-308 ("Duration
of Contract") provides a default rule of a perpetual license in certain instances. See
Uniform Computer Act, supra note 129, § 2B-308(2)(b).
226. See Cohen, Electronic Vigilantism, supra note 82, at 1194-98.
227. See William E. Thomson, Jr. & Margaret Y. Chu, Overstepping the Bounds:
Copyright Misuse, Computer Law., Nov. 1998, at 1, 5.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See Madison, supra note 16, at 1116 n.382.
231. Cf. id. at 1139 (advocating an express delegation of authority from Congress to
federal courts in order to preserve the public domain). Allowing a court to strike
contractual provisions based on its view of what proper policy should be, however,
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last word from Congress was that computer programs are copyright-
able.z"2 In fact, CONTU expressly rejected trade secret and patent
protection as an alternative to copyright protection for computer
software.z3 Now, in addition to trade secret and patent protection,
contractual provisions may also be relied upon for proprietary protec-
tion. Congress has not addressed the high level of intellectual prop-
erty protection afforded computer programs. Therefore, whether it is
desirable for courts to impose their own policy judgments regarding
computer technologies in lieu of congressional direction on those mat-
ters is open to debate.
Both the public and private right owners deserve to know in ad-
vance the precise level of proprietary protection they can expect so
that they may conduct themselves accordingly. Courts have the ability
to make policy only on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, courts histori-
cally have resisted prodding to police the private market.' Further,
a judicially constructed solution would place upon courts the onus of
determining and responding to rapidly evolving market conditions
and exigencies. Because courts have limited ability to gather and in-
terpret information regarding industry practice, the risk of judicial er-
ror is quite high.3 5 Finally, and most compelling, with regard to
computer programs, it is not clear that the recognition of a public right
to reverse engineer represents a desirable, or even workable, means of
promoting access to computer software. 36
B. A Private-Market Ordering
While some have advocated judicial intervention, others suggest
that only through the enforcement of private agreements will com-
puter software be adequately protected. This view finds its support in
the lack of preemption of contractual rights, economic theory, and the
eroding of incentives to creation.
arguably undermines societal benefits produced by the commercialization of informa-
tion. See Nimmer, Breaking Barriers, supra note 211, at 872.
232. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
233. See Haynes, supra note 49, at 254.
234. Most courts refuse to recognize an independent good faith cause of action
under Article 2 of the UCC. See Steven H. Hilfinger, Note, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust
Co.: Discretionary Financing and the Implied Duty of Good Faith, 81 Nw. U. L Rev.
539, 550 (1987).
235. See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 241, 296 (1998).
236. The common theme that joins the approaches previously discussed is that
prohibitions against reverse engineering represent an improper extension of intellec-
tual property rights. See Nimmer, Breaking Barriers, supra note 211, at 867. Whether
prohibitions against reverse engineering improperly extend, or merely buttress, pre-
existing intellectual property rights hinges upon diametrically opposed constructions
of the intellectual property laws. See infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
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1. The Three Justifications
a. Lack of Preemption
The argument that reverse engineering should be prohibited relies
on the premise that the Constitution provides for intellectual property
rights to give authors and inventors an incentive to creation.23 7 There-
fore, if producers believe that their works may be appropriated pre-
maturely by others before they have an opportunity to recoup their
investments, they will tend to undersupply the market for those
works, which will lead to market failure.2" Accordingly, these advo-
cates argue, private producers must be permitted to prohibit reverse
engineering to preserve this incentive. That private markets should
determine the appropriate degree of re-use of information is the
premise of the proposed draft of the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act.239
Under this view, the federal intellectual property statutes represent
a default system of rights that help to avoid the transaction costs in-
volved in contracting with individual purchasers of proprietary mate-
rial.240 Nothing, however, prohibits the parties from creating their
own set of proprietary rights between themselves through private con-
tracts.241 Therefore, if the private contractual prohibitions are not ob-
jectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general, they are not
subject to preemption by the federal laws.242 In other words, freedom
of contract reigns. Arguably, this view of the federal intellectual prop-
erty laws as a set of default rules was implicitly adopted by the Sev-
enth Circuit in ProCD.243
b. Economic Theory
Given that computer program code is subject to quick and easy
244copying, economic theory also sanctions prohibitions against re-
verse engineering. Under the microeconomic theory of perfect com-
petition, the relevant market consists of products that not only are
numerous, but also are fungible commodities.245 Intellectual property
furthers this model of competition and learning by allowing individu-
als access to others' ideas so that they may build incrementally upon
those ideas.2 46 Therefore, the intellectual property model fosters a
237. See supra note 17.
238. See supra note 146.
239. See Madison, supra note 16, at 1124.
240. See O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 183, at 78.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See Madison, supra note 16, at 1124; O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra
note 183, at 81.
244. See supra note 146.
245. See Clapes, supra note 15, at 961.
246. See Kathryn D. Piele, Three Years After Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.:
What Is Fair Game for Parodists?, 18 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 75, 99 (1997).
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system of market competition that results in competition based on
price.2 4 7 Yet competition based on price may be less than ideal in the
computer program context. Firms competing on the basis of price
may realize less profits than they would in a system of competition
based on innovation and differentiated products.2 48 The greater prof-
its realized in a system of competition based on innovation may be
utilized in the research and development of new products.24 9 Thus,
the recognition of a public right to reverse engineer is inconsistent
with innovation, for free-riding competitors are allowed to simply dis-
assemble and change pre-existing programs.5 0 A prohibition against
reverse engineering, on the other hand, forces innovation through the
development of new technologies, not simply the reformulation of ex-
isting ones. The public interest in greater consumer choice and new
innovative products is thereby furthered.
In addition, a right to reverse engineer may not be required to pro-
mote public access to computer software; natural market forces may
further this goal without prompting from the courts and Congress.25 1
Indeed, recent market phenomena occurring in the software industry
suggest that natural market forces will prompt migration away from a
closed proprietary model of computer software development and
competition. The surging popularity of open source softvare, 25
which is software made available to users, typically over the Internet,
in readable and comprehendible source code format, is evidence of
this trend 53 Open source software, however, does not necessarily
mean the software is distributed for free," 4 and manufacturers of
computer programs are able to maintain their proprietary rights in the
original source code using various licenses.55 The open source model
247. See Clapes, supra note 15, at 947-48.
248. See id. at 947.
249. See id. at 962.
250. See id. at 963; Miller, supra note 15, at 1026-27.
251. See Miller, supra note 15, at 1031.
252. See, eg., Amy Harmon, Open-Source Software Takes Surprise Leap in Popu-
larity, San Diego Union-Trib., Feb. 9, 1999, at 3 (stating that open source software was
one of the year's most striking developments); Mark Leibovich, The Spreading Grass-
Roots Threat to Microsoft: Eric Raymond Crusades for "Open-Source" Software,
Wash. Post, Dec. 3, 1998, at Al (noting that open source software has recently "forged
dramatic mainstream inroads").
253. See Harvey Blume, If You Love Your Online Business Set Your Code Free,
New Media, Jan. 1999, at 26, 26.
254. See Kevin Tolly, A Reality Check on "Open Source", Network World, Feb. 8,
1999, at 22, 22.
255. See, eg., Leander Kahney & Polly Sprenger, Apple's Open-Source Movement,
(Mar. 15, 1999) <http'Jlwww..wired.comlnewvs/technology/story/18488.html?wnpgl>
(discussing the difference between free softvare and open source software); Malcolm
Maclachlan, Jii: Start of "Semi-Open" Source Movement, (Jan. 28, 1999) <http./l
www.techweb.com/printableArticle?doc-idBl9990128S001> (noting that the Sun
Community Source License is a combination of open source and proprietary models);
Peter G. Neumann, Robust Open-Source Softvare, Comm. of the ACM, Feb. 1998, at
128, 128 (providing examples of open, but proprietary, software). The licenses typi-
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of software development greatly reduces a company's research, devel-
opment, and distribution costs because it allows the software to be
refined by developers all over the world.256 Because of the number of
people who work on perfecting the software, open source software is
more reliable and fails less often than closed source software. 7
Users of open source software are free to modify, customize, and
otherwise adapt the program to their needs. 258 Additionally, the In-
ternet is successful, in large part, because it operates as an open sys-
tem of code. 9 Commentators predict that libraries of code will soon
be available to users and programmers who desire to modify it and
use it to suit their individual needs.2 60
The move toward an open source and reusable code system, widely
regarded as a paradigm shift away from closed proprietary
software,2 6' is an example of competition by innovation, and signals a
movement toward increased competition in markets for software
262 Tesitisales, support, maintenance, and repair services. The shift is strong
evidence that competition in the software industry does not hinge
solely on proprietary rights in program code. Whereas the closed pro-
prietary model of computer software is analogous to a car sold with its
hood welded shut, 63 the new open model of computer software rec-
ognizes the public's right to tinker. Public access to source code is
viewed as commercially desirable, provided, of course, that private
owners can retain their proprietary rights, through licenses, in the pro-
gram code.264 Accordingly, the necessity of reserving to the public a
cally allow users to alter the original source code, but all modifications must be sent
back to the right holder. See Deborah Gage, Should Java Go Open Source? (Feb. 12,
1999) <http://www.zdnet.comlzdnnlstories/news/0,4586,2208772,00.html>.
256. See Blume, supra note 253, at 29.
257. See Charles C. Mann, Programs to the People, Tech. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 36,
41.
258. See id. at 38.
259. See Blume, supra note 253, at 29.
260. See Haldiman, supra note 86, at 654. Object-orientated programming will
make portions of computer code easily reusable. See id. at 653. Additionally, auto-
mated rights management technologies will provide manufacturers with the ability to
police the use of their code, and allow users to make provision with the proprietary
right holder for the use of that code so that they are not considered infringers. See
Bell, supra note 132, at 564-67.
261. See, e.g., Josh McHugh, For the Love of Hacking, Forbes, Aug. 10, 1998, at 94,
100 (noting that open source software is an alternative to closed commercial software
and arguing that perhaps Microsoft does not truly have a monopoly in the software
industry); Levy, Code Warriors, supra note 4, at 60 (documenting shift towards open
source software); Leibovich, supra note 252 (stating that open source software poses a
significant threat to Microsoft's continued domination of the software industry); John
Markoff, Apple Adopts "Open Source" Code Strategy, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1999, at
C1 (noting that Apple has embraced open source software).
262. Tim O'Reilly, The Open-Source Revolution, Release 1.0, Nov. 1998, at 3, 8-16.
263. See McHugh, supra note 261, at 100.
264. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
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right to reverse engineer to promote access is questionable at best,
and imperfect at least. 65
c. Disincentive to Producers
The recognition of a public right to reverse engineer may provide a
significant disincentive to creators of computer programs. The re-
search and development costs associated with program development
are extremely high.266 In the past, program producers were somewhat
insulated from reverse engineering because it was an extremely diffi-
cult and uncertain process.267 Therefore, manufacturers were pro-
vided with the lead-time and ability to recoup their investments
before competitors were able to reverse engineer their programs and
develop competing products.26 Now, however, recent market devel-
opments may have greatly simplified the practice of reverse engineer-
ing, making it more difficult for program manufacturers to recoup
their investments before a competing market substitute is launched.
Numerous reverse engineering programs have become commercially
available. 69 The widespread adoption of Java programming-7' raises
additional fears among computer program manufacturers due to the
ease with which Java programming may be reverse engineered.2 71 If
reverse engineering is becoming easier and more efficient, the argu-
ment for the enforceability of private prohibitions against reverse en-
gineering gains renewed vigor.
2 72
265. See Lemley & McGowan, Legal Implications, supra note 153, at 523-30.
266. See Troy Paredes, Copyright Misuse and Tying: Will Courts Stop Misusing Mis-
use?, 9 High Tech. LJ. 271, 309-15 (1994).
267. See Karjala, Program Structure, supra note 146, at 535.
268. See id.
269. See Craig Menefee, PC Briefs (July 2, 1998) <httpJ/www.newsbytes.comnews
98/114070.html>; Godfrey Nolan, Java: Easy Target for Illegal Re-Engineers (Mar. 3,
1997) <http'l/www.computerwire.com/cbr/1997/2206_29a.htm>.
270. See Lemley & McGowan, Competitive Proprietary, supra note 13, at 485.
271. See Nolan, supra note 269.
272. Moreover, U.S. policy regarding the legality of reverse engineering computer
programs is ambiguous. When Japan considered expressly incorporating a reverse
engineering exception into its copyright laws, the United States vigorously opposed
the proposal, fearing that the exception would allow American software to be unduly
appropriated by Japanese firms. See Graham & Zerbe, supra note 171, at 69. Further,
while certain federal intellectual property statutes expressly recognize a right to re-
verse engineer, the copyright and patent statutes contain no similar exception. In the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, see Pub. L. No. 98-620, tit. III, 98 Stat.
3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1994)), Congress expressly recognized the
right to reverse engineer. See 17 U.S.C. § 906(a); see also Brooktree Corp. v. Ad-
vanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1565-67 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (discussing the
Act). Thus, the negative implication arising from the absence of specific allowance
for reverse engineering under the copyright and patent statutes is that such a right
was never intended by Congress, but was read into the law by courts addressing par-
ticularized market conditions. Evidence that supports this argument is that recently
proposed legislation, if enacted, may have the impact of making reverse engineering a
federal felony. See Mills, supra note 68, at 127-28. Additionally, the recently enacted
Digital Millennium Copyright Act prohibits circumvention of "technological meas-
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2. Criticisms of Private Agreements
Just as judicial intervention has been criticized, it is not clear that
the private market will ultimately establish an appropriate balance be-
tween public and private rights. The debate concerning reverse engi-
neering is magnified because shrinkwrap licenses are now generally
enforced.73 Private right holders may employ licenses in an effort to
retain a level of control over their code not conferred by federal stat-
utes.274 By a simple license provision, a software producer may create
exclusive rights virtually unlimited in scope. Those licenses often are
employed to maintain rights through secrecy and proprietary control;
sometimes they are used to preserve rights after public disclosure. 75
Shrinkwrap licenses also help to ensure that trade secret claims will
not be preempted by providing the "extra element" of breach of
promise or agreement.276 Moreover, although shrinkwrap license pro-
visions may be objectionable upon grounds applicable to contracts in
general, the exclusive rights upon which private parties may agree are
not circumscribed by statute, as they are under the federal copyright
and patent statutes.
The exclusive proprietary rights conferred by the federal intellec-
tual property statutes are limited both in time and in extent.277 On the
other hand, the rights available under state laws are not as re-
stricted.278 Contract protection for computer programs, in addition to
copyright, patent, and trade secret protection, is a recent development
that threatens to confer upon proprietary owners absolute control
over their products for an indefinite period of time.279 Therefore, the
fundamental difference between the exclusive rights conferred under
the federal statutes, and the rights conferred by state law, is that
licenses and trade secrets, unlike copyrights and patents, are limited
only by the private market. Given shrinkwrap's potential to swallow
the intellectual property regime,280 however, leaving this ordering
solely to the private market may be disadvantageous to the public
interest.
Intellectual property does not endeavor to confer upon owners un-
restricted control over their creations; the objective is to give owners
ures" that control access to copyrighted works. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). Query whether compiling source code into
object code is a technological measure that controls access to a copyrighted program.
If it is, one may argue that reverse engineering circumvents this process, and is, there-
fore, prohibited by the Act.
273. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
274. See Cohen, Self-Help, supra note 182, at 1090.
275. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
277. See supra Part I.A-B.
278. See supra Part I.C-D.
279. See supra note 225. As a practical matter, however, the software is likely to be
obsolete long before the expiration of the license.
280. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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only a sufficient incentive to create.2" Indeed, "'[s]ufficient incentive'
.. is something less than 'perfect control.'"" Therefore, at some
point, it arguably becomes inefficient to maintain that private owners
may properly withhold works from the public sphere to preserve the
incentive to creation.8 3 Moreover, insofar as owners are granted ex-
clusive control over their works, the cost of new works is raised, and,
in certain situations, the public will not have access to the works.2s4
Finally, a high level of exclusive control allows producers to prevent
second-comers from building upon the unprotected ideas embodied in
their works, which frustrates and unduly impedes the creation of "sec-
ond-generation" works.'
The conflict that reverse engineering has posed is illustrative of the
same tensions that govern intellectual property law: the difficulty in
drawing the line between public and private rights. With regard to
computer programs, access to a program's source code, through re-
verse engineering or otherwise, is at times desirable.2s6 Yet, un-
restricted access to a program's source code will create an imbalance
in the intellectual property equation by depriving producers of the
ability to recoup their investments327 If this occurs, there will exist no
incentive to develop new products, which would be contrary to the
public interest.3 Therefore, as discussed below in part IV, to the ex-
tent that this dilemma cannot be addressed adequately by the courts
or the private market alone, it is appropriate for Congress to
intervene.
IV. AN INTERMEDIATE COMPROMISE FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Some have proposed a compulsory licensing system for computer
program code,2 9 which would be the most "open" solution because it
would allow interested parties unrestricted access to another's code
upon the payment of a compulsory fee. 219 Others have proposed a
complete ban on reverse engineering, which would foster a "closed"
system.291 A more desirable solution would attempt to regulate be-
281. See supra note 17.
282. Lawrence Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, 11 St. John's J. Legal Com-
ment. 635, 638 (1996).
283. See Lemley, Beyond Preemption, supra note 134, at 125; see also Lemley &
McGowan, Legal Implications, supra note 153, at 526 ("[I]t does not make economic
sense to give complete control over information to owners of intellectual property.").
284. See Lemley, Beyond Preemption, supra note 134, at 124.
285. Id at 125.
286. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
289. See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39
Stan. L. Rev. 1329, 1371 (1987); Samuelson et al., supra note 16, at 2414-15.
290. See Samuelson et al., supra note 16, at 2414.
291. See id. at 2392-93 ("[A] complete ban [on reverse engineering] is contrary to
basic norms of competition law.").
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tween these two extremes. The ultimate solution must be a compro-
mise, not treading too heavily on the rights of owners, nor allowing
those owners to wield their rights as a club against competition. The
definitive and unambiguous solution must strike an appropriate bal-
ance between proprietary right holders and the public. To that end,
Congress is the governing body primarily charged with determining
public policy." z A decree by Congress would give right holders and
the public advance notice of the proprietary rights available to them,
and would also help to establish a middle ground between the judici-
ary and the private market.
Congress should give bolder force and effect to the constitutionally
derived phrase "limited exclusive control." '93 Congress should allow
proprietary owners the freedom to establish private state law rights, in
addition to those rights conferred by federal laws, to provide authors
and inventors of computer programs with a period of true exclusive
control over their works.2 94 Proprietary right owners would be per-
mitted to use the federal patent and copyright laws as a default set of
rules, which could be expanded or constricted as private individuals
see fit. This way, producers are still given tremendous first-mover in-
centives, and are imbued with confidence that their proprietary rights
are secure for the period of exclusive control.2 95 During this period of
limited competition, producers would be provided with the opportu-
nity to establish their works as the consumer standard,2 96 and to reap
substantial profits. Fear that one's product will be appropriated pre-
maturely by others would be alleviated. Thus, producers would be
provided with the incentive to invest, facilitated by profits reaped dur-
ing the period of exclusive control, in the creation of new and innova-
tive products, rather than in the protection of previously marketed
products.297 Moreover, a high level of exclusive control in the
292. See Madison, supra note 16, at 1135.
293. See supra note 17.
294. If a program can be reverse engineered by competitors, the rights holder nec-
essarily does not have exclusive control over his work. Further, as the intellectual
property laws do not create monopolies, see Clapes, supra note 15, at 948-49, con-
tracts necessary to help establish a period of true exclusive control.
295. Giving producers the ability to protect their software under copyright, patent,
trade secret, and contract laws will provide them with the ability to preserve their
natural lead-time in the market, which lead-time is necessary to prevent market fail-
ure. See Samuelson et al., supra note 16, at 2413.
296. Indeed, there is considerable value in familiarizing consumers with particular
software. See id. at 2375. Second-comers will find it difficult to lure consumers away
from software with which they are familiar and have spent time to learn. See id.
297. If producers are permitted to prevent the reverse engineering of their
software, this will lessen the need for the producer to monitor the market for reverse
engineering technologies, and expend resources on thwarting attempts at reverse en-
gineering and on monitoring legislative efforts to address reverse engineering. See
O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary, supra note 104, at 499.
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software industry may in fact be beneficial under certain
circumstances.298
The period of exclusive control, however, should be limited by con-
gressional decree that, after a period of time, as a condition to main-
taining federal copyright and patent protection, program producers
must disclose their source code.299 This requirement effectively fore-
closes redress under state trade secret laws for those owners who de-
sire to maintain federal intellectual property protection for their
products.3 ° State trade secret rights, and the ability to maintain the
secrecy of one's software interfaces and compatibility controls, would
be exchanged for certain and extensive protection under the federal
statutes and contract laws.301
The rights conferred under the copyright and patent laws, of course,
are not lost upon disclosure of a work to the public. Admittedly, pri-
vate right owners have an interest in seeing that their creations are not
appropriated by others, and this interest leads naturally to a desire to
shroud their works in secrecy. The compromise is that in phase one,
the period in which both state contract and trade secret and federal
copyright and patent rights are entertained, producers can be certain
of a high level of proprietary protection. In this phase, producers
would be permitted to prohibit reverse engineering. Further,
although reverse engineering would become unnecessary after disclo-
sure, producers would maintain rights in their code under contract
laws, rather than have those rights foreclosed by a general approach
to federal preemption of shrinkwrap contracts. Moreover, owners
that desire to maintain the secrecy of their source code are able to
298. Microsoft's dominance undeniably has produced numerous societal benefits,
such as standardization. Professor Mark Patterson notes that, even if competition is
eliminated, a standard-enhancing move may increase efficiency overall because con-
sumers will benefit from the increased adoption of the standard. See Mark R Patter-
son, Coercion, Deception, and Other Demand-Increasing Practices in Antitnst Law,
66 Antitrust Li. 1, 74 n.323 (1997).
299. After the expiration of the standard-setting time period, the government, by
requiring disclosure, would open the standard in order to encourage competition. See
Lemley & McGowan, Competitive Propriety, supra note 13, at 506 (arguing that the
law should encourage open standards); supra note 1 and accompanying text (contend-
ing that "openness" is good). The time at which disclosure must occur may be based
on the date of the first commercial distribution of the software, see 17 U.S.C.
§§ 904(a), 908(a) (1994), and should vary depending on the nature of the software
program. For example, Congress could require that the source code to operating sys-
tems be disclosed after a shorter time period than application programs. For a discus-
sion of the differences between operating systems and application programs, see
Samuelson, supra note 3, at 676-82.
300. Nevertheless, this approach would be less intrusive upon the rights of software
producers than a "public distribution equals publication" rule, which would deny
trade secret protection to a program's source code even if the program was publicly
distributed in object code format. Cohen, Electronic Wgilantism, supra note 82, at
1113-14.
301. Trade secrets are only protectible as long as no one discovers them. See supra
note 91 and accompanying text.
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"opt out" of protection under the federal statutes, and rely instead
upon trade secret protection and contract to protect their products. 3 2
Disclosure of a program's source code need not be made to the
public at large. Rather, Congress should require only that the source
code be placed on file with the respective statutory office. 30 3 Inter-
ested parties would be allowed to view the source code upon the pay-
ment of a processing fee. Part of this fee could be used to maintain
the office, and any excess could be paid to the authors of the computer
programs. The relevant office would keep records of who examined
the source code, making it easier for right owners to prove access to
their works if alleging copyright infringement.3 4
Additionally, even if a competitor is allowed to view a program's
source code, that competitor, if he desires to produce a market substi-
tute, must write his own program code,30 5 or license aspects of the
code from its owner.30 6 Thus, a disclosure requirement is the first step
toward promoting greater software re-use because those who desire to
use another's code must know who owns what. If licensing permission
from the owner is withheld, a second-comer would be free to use the
ideas embedded in the code to produce a competing or interoperable
302. In fact, state law protection may provide more effective protection than fed-
eral intellectual property statutes in certain circumstances. See Jane C. Ginsburg,
Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in the United States
and Abroad, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 151, 151 (1997). At least one commentator has advo-
cated an opt out approach to federal intellectual property. See Bell, supra note 132, at
615-16; see also Lemley, Beyond Preemption, supra note 134, at 150 (agreeing that an
opt out scheme may be quite attractive to intellectual property owners).
303. The Copyright Office registration requirements mandate only that very small
portions of a copyrighted program's source code be placed on file. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.20(c)(2)(vii) (1998). The Patent Office does not require that a program's source
code be disclosed. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
304. A plaintiff alleging copyright infringement must prove two elements: (1) own-
ership of a valid copyright and (2) copying of original elements of the work. See Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). Copying may be
established through indirect evidence, including evidence that the alleged infringer
had access to the copyrighted work. See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol
Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1998).
305. This Note does not go so far as to propose a system of compulsory licensing,
for the success of the product in the marketplace in the phase in which both federal
and state law rights are available may vary, and to cut off all control over the use of
one's code after disclosure may not allow producers to recoup their investments in
their software. Moreover, a recent study of the economics of information concluded
that, provided competitors write their own source code, imitative competition in the
software industry should be encouraged. See Karjala, Program Structure, supra note
146, at 536-38.
306. Right owners will object that their program code can be appropriated easily by
second-comers who make minor changes and claim the disguised code as their own.
See Miller, supra note 15, at 1026. The response is that simply changing another's
code to hide all traces of illicit copying is not an easy task. See Cohen, Electronic
Vigilantism, supra note 82, at 1123. In any case, this author is confident that courts are




product. Clearly, both the public and private interests would be fur-
thered by this balanced approach.
CONCLUSION
Unquestionably, computers will play an ever-expanding role in the
lives of people in the generations to come. It is in the interests of both
software producers and the public that the level of proprietary protec-
tion afforded computer programs be determined and clearly demar-
cated. Although much ink has been spilled regarding the appropriate
level of protection that should be available to computer programs, the
development of intellectual property protection for computer pro-
grams has been characterized by a haphazard and disjointed approach
by individual courts addressing varying factual circumstances. This
Note is yet another attempt at balancing the intellectual property
equation. The approach suggested herein is advantageous because it
endeavors to remain true to both oft-conflicting constitutional com-
mands that authors and inventors be provided with an incentive to
creation, and that this incentive is provided primarily for the benefit
of the public. If Congress does not address the issue, however, deter-
mining the level of intellectual property protection for computer pro-
grams will be a task foisted upon the courts. Leaving that burden to
the courts would be harmful because intellectual property protection
for computer software, a nationally and internationally marketed
product, will vary by jurisdiction. Moreover, if left unchecked, private
owners may "shrink" the public sphere to an undesirable degree.
Clearly, congressional action is needed. In the absence of congres-
sional decree, this Note's approach, like many others, will remain little
more than a good idea.
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